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For some 35 years after Fischhoff’s (1975) seminal ar-
ticle on hindsight bias, researchers have been interested 
in the cognitive effects of possessing outcome knowledge 
(see overviews and introductions by Blank, Musch, & Pohl, 
2007; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage & Pohl, 2003). 
For example, in Fischhoff’s (1975) classic demonstration of 
hindsight bias, people who were told about the (alleged) out-
come of a 19th-century military conflict between the Brit-
ish and the Gurkhas perceived this outcome as more likely 
or inevitable from the start, as compared with people with-
out outcome knowledge. Fischhoff (1975) initially coined 
the term creeping determinism for this phenomenon. Other 
research has highlighted people’s beliefs of having known 
the outcome all along, leading to the hindsight bias being 
dubbed the knew-it-all-along effect (Fischhoff, 1977). Fi-
nally, hindsight bias has been found in people’s recollec-
tions of earlier predictions of events or factual outcomes 
(e.g., Blank, Fischer, & Erdfelder, 2003; Fischhoff, 1977; 
Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 1988). For in-
stance, having initially predicted that the Eiffel tower was 
200 m tall, people received outcome feedback (the Eiffel 
tower is 300 m tall) and then, on average, remembered hav-
ing made predictions of more than 200 m (Hell et al., 1988), 
thereby showing a bias toward the factual outcome.
The common denominator of all these variants of hind-
sight bias is that outcome knowledge biases people’s hind-
sight cognitions—specifically, toward perceiving events 
or facts to be more determined, inevitable, or foresee-
able, or toward misremembering their own predictions as 
better than they actually were. This holds even if people 
are explicitly asked to ignore their knowledge about the 
outcome (Fischhoff, 1975). In the words of Hawkins and 
Hastie (1990, p. 311), “the hindsight bias is a projection of 
new knowledge into the past accompanied by a denial that 
the outcome information has influenced judgment.”
Hindsight bias has long been thought to be primarily a 
cognitive phenomenon, a type of cognitive illusion (Pohl, 
2004). Consequently, explanations of hindsight bias have 
focused on biased causal reasoning (e.g., Hawkins & 
Hastie, 1990; Pezzo, 2003; Roese & Olson, 1996; Was-
serman, Lempert, & Hastie, 1991) or biased memory re-
construction processes (e.g., Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998; 
Pohl, Eisenhauer, & Hardt, 2003; Stahlberg & Maass, 
1998). More recent research, however, has emphasized 
that self-related motivational processes play a major role 
in it as well (for overviews, see Musch & Wagner, 2007; 
Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007; Renner, 2003). This becomes most 
obvious when hindsight judgments are made regarding 
event outcomes that have some emotional significance for 
the self and invoke self-defensive processes (see Sedikides 
& Gregg, 2008, for a recent overview of self-related mo-
tivational processing). It is on such self-related motiva-
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gued that “it may well be that negative self-relevant out-
comes will attenuate hindsight . . . only when the person 
feels some sense of personal responsibility for the out-
come (culpability)” (p. 452). Similar arguments can be 
found in Pezzo (2003, p. 439), Pezzo and Pezzo (2007, 
pp. 154–157), and Pezzo and Beckstead (2008, p. 493f). 
Tykocinski and Steinberg (2005), focusing on retroactive 
pessimism, also discussed the role of controllability and 
argued that “it is easier to conclude that ‘I never had a 
chance to succeed’ when the negative outcomes are un-
controllable” (p. 554). They go on to actually demon-
strate that people show more retroactive pessimism in a 
low-control than in a high-control scenario (Tykocinski & 
Steinberg, 2005, Experiment 2). In short, the controllabil-
ity account of divergent hindsight effects of self-relevant 
negative events would lead one to expect decreased hind-
sight bias in high-control situations, where perceived (or 
claimed; Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007) unforeseeability serves to 
reduce responsibility and blame for the outcome. By con-
trast, it would lead one to expect increased hindsight bias 
in low-control situations, where retroactive pessimism 
serves to cope with disappointment.
A second explanation draws on the nature of the hind-
sight judgments made in the two contradictory bodies of 
research. As was already mentioned in passing in the de-
scription of the studies above, studies on negative decision 
outcomes asked participants how foreseeable the outcome 
was, and Tykocinski and colleagues’ retroactive pessimism 
studies used probability judgments as the dependent vari-
able. From the perspective of a recent reconception of hind-
sight bias (Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008), 
this is an important difference, since it relates the two sets 
of studies to two different components of hindsight bias—
namely, foreseeability and inevitability1 impressions.
Blank et al. (2008) suggested and provided evidence 
that the phenomenology of the hindsight bias actually en-
compasses three distinct and empirically separable com-
ponents: foreseeability and inevitability, as mentioned 
before, and memory distortion (which is less important 
in the present context). The foreseeability and inevitabil-
ity components refer to impressions that event outcomes 
were (to some degree) foreseeable and inevitable, respec-
tively. Hence, hindsight bias in terms of these components 
emerges if events are perceived as more foreseeable or 
inevitable in hindsight than in foresight. Generally, the 
different hindsight components refer to different entities 
and serve different psychological functions (among other 
differences between them; see Blank et al., 2008). Spe-
cifically, foreseeability refers to one’s subjective state of 
knowledge at a given point in time, whereas inevitability 
addresses an objective state of the world.
Clearly, foreseeability is essential in decision outcome 
studies: What matters is not so much how objectively 
likely the outcome was but what one could have subjec-
tively known about these real-world contingencies. By 
contrast, inevitability is central for retroactive pessimism: 
Consolation can come only from the belief that there was 
really (i.e., objectively) nothing that could have changed 
the outcome; whether or not one knew about (i.e., could 
foresee) these contingencies is largely irrelevant. Hence, 
tional influence on hindsight cognitions that we focus in 
the present article, trying to resolve an apparent contradic-
tion between relevant research findings.
Consider a situation in which somebody has made a 
decision that turns out to be a bad one. Instead of believ-
ing in hindsight that they knew this all along, as a strictly 
cognitive view of hindsight bias would hold (unless the 
outcome is surprising—in which case, hindsight bias can 
be attenuated or even reversed; see Müller & Stahlberg, 
2007, for an overview), quite a number of studies have 
shown that hindsight is reduced and often eliminated 
under such conditions (Louie, 1999, 2005; Louie, Cur-
ren, & Harich, 2000; Mark, Boburka, Eyssell, Cohen, & 
Mellor, 2003; Mark & Mellor, 1991; Pezzo & Beckstead, 
2008). Importantly, this holds even if any possibly con-
founding influence of surprise is controlled for (Louie, 
1999). The typical explanation of reduced hindsight bias 
for negative decision outcomes is that people try to avoid 
unfavorable implications for the self that would result 
from showing hindsight bias in this situation. Why, if they 
knew all along what would happen, would they have made 
such a bad decision in the first place? Hence, claiming 
that they could not foresee the negative outcome protects 
them from being regarded as frivolous or outright stupid 
by others or, in fact, themselves (Louie, 1999, 2005; Louie 
et al., 2000; Mark et al., 2003; Mark & Mellor, 1991).
So far, so good. The picture is complicated, however, by 
a set of studies by Tykocinski and colleagues (Tykocinski, 
2001; Tykocinski, Pick, & Kedmi, 2002; Tykocinski & 
Steinberg, 2005), who drew attention to a phenomenon they 
termed retroactive pessimism, which can be considered a 
form of motivated hindsight bias. Using real-life settings, as 
well as scenarios, they found that people show hindsight bias 
especially when they are disappointed about outcomes. To 
illustrate, Tykocinski (2001) compared pre- and postratings 
of the candidates’ chances in the 1999 Israeli presidential 
elections and found that supporters of the losing candidate 
were especially prone to downgrade his chances in hind-
sight and to inflate those of the winning candidate. Similar 
results, using different types of events, have been observed 
by Sanna and Chang (2003) and Wann, Grieve, Waddill, 
and Martin (2008). To explain this increased hindsight bias 
for personally negative outcomes, Tykocinski argued that 
retroactive pessimism serves to cope with disappointment: 
Perceiving the outcome as inevitable renders it more palat-
able (“I never had a chance”).
The intriguing problem that arises from these two bod-
ies of research is that both of them address hindsight 
consequences of self-relevant negative event outcomes 
and these consequences are of an opposite nature. In the 
decision-making case, hindsight bias is attenuated or 
even eliminated, and in the retroactive pessimism case, 
it is accentuated. How to explain this divergence? A first 
explanation—figuring more or less explicitly in some of 
the aforementioned articles—centers around the notion of 
event controllability. The key idea is that a negative event 
outcome reflects unfavorably on the self only if the person 
has some responsibility for it, which presupposes control-
lability. For instance, Mark et al. (2003), comparing their 
own results with those of Tykocinski and colleagues, ar-
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making studies that showed a reduction or elimination of 
hindsight bias, the dependent measures are obvious mea-
sures of foreseeability and require no further comment 
(Louie, 1999; Mark et al., 2003; Mark & Mellor, 1991). 
In three others (Louie, 2005; Louie et al., 2000; Pezzo 
& Beckstead, 2008), the participants were asked (1) to 
make hindsight predictions of the outcome or (2) to re-
call predictions that they had actually made. Despite the 
difference in design between these two cases (a so-called 
hypothetical vs. a memory design;2 see Pohl, 2007, for an 
overview of hindsight bias research methodology), both 
are related to foreseeability: Stating that one (1) would 
have predicted or (2) in fact did predict the outcome es-
sentially implies that one (claims that one) foresaw this 
to happen (cf. Fischhoff, 1977, for a similar line of argu-
ment). Thus, all the studies that showed reduced hindsight 
bias for self-relevant negative events essentially captured 
the foreseeability component of hindsight bias.
By contrast, all of Tykocinski and colleagues’ retroactive 
pessimism studies, as well as those by Sanna and Chang 
(2003, Experiment 2) and Wann et al. (2008), employed 
probability ratings. These resemble inevitability judg-
ments, since in both studies an objective state of the world 
was addressed (“it is highly likely”; “it is inevitable”), 
as opposed to foreseeability judgments, which address a 
subjective state of knowledge concerning this state (e.g., 
“I could not foresee it”). Also, perceiving an outcome as 
100% likely means perceiving it as inevitable. Probability 
and inevitability are not identical, though, since, for in-
stance, the latter involves an element of causal determina-
there is a logical connection between the psychological 
functions of the components in the present context (i.e., 
deflection of responsibility vs. reduction of disappoint-
ment) and their nature (i.e., referring to a subjective state 
of mind vs. an objective state of affairs).
In summary, this second explanation of our puzzle main-
tains that not controllability but “componentness” is the key 
to understanding the opposite hindsight effects: The fore-
seeability component is congenial for the effects obtained 
in decision-making studies, and the inevitability compo-
nent is the natural vehicle for retroactive pessimism effects. 
Without this component-to-effect match, the pattern of 
results obtained in studies on negative self-relevant event 
outcomes would be less clear-cut. This is not to say that it 
would disappear altogether, since there might be an inde-
pendent contribution of controllability, as outlined above. 
In fact, the two approaches may not so much contradict as 
supplement each other; in any case, this is in part an empiri-
cal question and the topic of the study presented below.
Previous Relevant Evidence for Our  
Component Explanation
There are at least two lines of evidence that give the 
component account some credibility. The first is almost 
trivial but, nevertheless, important: It is the confirmation 
that the dependent measures used to assess hindsight bias 
in the studies introduced above can, in fact, be related to 
the foreseeability and inevitability components along the 
lines discussed above. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
relevant measures and wordings. In three of the decision-
Table 1 
Measures of Hindsight Bias Used in Studies Involving Self-Relevant Negative Outcomes
Study  Measure/Question Wording
Studies That Showed a Reduction or Elimination of Hindsight Bias
 Louie (1999) “I would have predicted that the value would definitely decrease/increase” (direct measure of foreseeability)
 Louie (2005) Hindsight postdictions of outcome (indirectly related to foreseeability)
 Louie, Curren, & Harich (2000) Recall of foresight likelihood ratings of outcome (indirectly related to foreseeability)
 Mark, Boburka, Eyssell,  
  Cohen, & Mellor (2003)
Three-item scale: (1) “I was surprised by the performance of this stock” [reverse coded]; (2) “I could foresee 
what this stock was going to do”; (3) “It was obvious after the first four-day trading period that this stock was 
going to perform as it did” (direct measure of foreseeability)
 Mark & Mellor (1991) Scaled response alternatives: (1) “I’m not sure I ever saw it coming”; (2) “I wasn’t sure, but suspected it was 
coming”; (3) “I saw it coming all the way” (direct measure of foreseeability)
 Pezzo & Beckstead (2008) Recall of foresight likelihood ratings of several outcomes (indirectly related to foreseeability)
Studies That Showed an Increase in Hindsight Bias
 Sanna & Chang (2003) Experiment 1: inevitability ratings—“what would you have estimated the inevitability that the overall outcome 
would ultimately turn out to be a failure?” (direct measure of inevitability)
Experiment 2: probability ratings—“what would you have thought the probability of performing poorly would 
be?” (closely related to inevitability)
 Tykocinski (2001) Probability ratings; Experiment 1—of “your chances to get to the store in time”; Experiment 2—of the chances 
of winning the election (closely related to inevitability)
 Tykocinski, Pick, & Kedmi  
  (2002)
Probability ratings; Experiment 1—of the chances to win the game; Experiment 2 and very similar in Experi-
ment 3—of “your chances of getting to the stipend office and submitting the forms in time” (closely related 
to inevitability)
 Tykocinski & Steinberg (2005) Probability ratings; Experiment 1—of their chances of making it to the flight on time considering all that 
had happened; Experiment 2—of their chances of reaching the university’s grant office before it had closed 
considering all that had happened (closely related to inevitability)
 Wann, Grieve, Waddill, &  
  Martin (2008)
Probability ratings of the chances to win the game; replicating Tykocinski et al.’s (2002) method (closely 
related to inevitability)
Note—Original wordings (where available) are given in quotation marks. See the text for a detailed discussion of the italicized remarks in 
parentheses.
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ness or inevitability—and might, under certain circum-
stances, even be perceived as synonymous. If so, this 
restricts the possibility of obtaining opposite hindsight 
effects for these components, and therefore, the present 
within-participants investigation must be considered a 
hard test of our components idea.
In general, with both types of influence having suffi-
cient theoretical and empirical plausibility, we expected 
that both controllability and hindsight component would 
affect the level of hindsight bias, although we did not have 
any prior views about the respective strength of these ef-
fects. That is, we expected high controllability and fore-
seeability to be the ideal combination for reduced or even 
reversed hindsight bias and low controllability and inevi-
tability to be the ideal combination for enhanced hindsight 




We used a scenario approach to investigate the effects of the 
two variables of primary interest, controllability and the hindsight 
component. Three between-participants experimental conditions 
were set up in order to establish (1) the amount of hindsight bias 
and (2) the degree to which the obtained effects were dependent 
on processes related to the self. In the actor–hindsight condition, 
the participants read the scenarios, including their outcomes, from 
the perspective of the actor and provided hindsight foreseeability 
and inevitability judgments. The participants in the actor–foresight 
condition read the same scenarios, but without outcome informa-
tion; this condition provided the necessary comparison to assess the 
degree of hindsight bias obtained in the actor–hindsight condition. 
Finally, the participants in the observer–hindsight condition read 
the same scenarios (with outcome information), but from an outside 
perspective—hence, lacking self-relevance. This condition served 
as a motivationally neutral comparison standard for the hindsight 
perceptions obtained in the actor–hindsight condition, in order to 
establish the degree to which the latter were influenced by any of the 
aforementioned self-related motivational processes. Three scenarios 
were used that had been selected from a larger sample and met cer-
tain criteria of suitability, on the basis of the results of a pretest.
Participants
A total of 210 nonpsychology students (mostly students of law, 
business, or education; 63% female; mean age 5 22.1 years, SD 5 
2.5 years, median 5 22 years) were approached on the university 
campus or responded to flyers and posters. They received €5 for half 
an hour of participation and were randomly assigned to the experi-
mental conditions.
Scenarios
To ensure generalizability of the results, we used three different 
scenarios, partly self-generated and partly inspired by similar sce-
narios employed by Tykocinski and colleagues and Zeelenberg et al. 
(1998). This also allowed us to manipulate controllability within 
participants, which would have been impossible if just one scenario 
had been used. Thus, each participant received the following three 
scenarios (although in different versions, according to experimental 
conditions): (1) The eBay scenario was about a person wanting to 
purchase a Swatch clock at an eBay auction but who is outbid either 
because the person is quite sure that nobody will make a higher bid 
and therefore uses the last minutes of the auction to have a cup of cof-
fee in the kitchen (high controllability) or because the Internet con-
nection breaks down and the person does not succeed in reinstalling 
it within the last minutes of the auction (low controllability). (2) The 
tion, whereas probability applies also to chance events. 
Hence, they should be substantially but not perfectly re-
lated, which, in fact, they turn out to be (r 5 .34 in Blank 
et al., 2008, Study 4; and r 5 .54 in Nestler, Blank, & von 
Collani, 2008, Experiment 2). In addition to these studies 
using probability measures, one study actually employed 
a single-item measure of inevitability (Sanna & Chang, 
2003). Overall, then, the evidence summarized in Table 1 
clearly supports our idea that the opposing findings in the 
two sets of studies are related to the difference between 
foreseeability and inevitability.
More direct evidence has come from a recent study by 
Blank and Nestler (2006) that investigated local citizens’ 
hindsight cognitions about the city of Leipzig’s failed ap-
plication to host the 2012 Olympic games. The Interna-
tional Olympic Committee’s decision in May 2004 to drop 
Leipzig from the shortlist of applicant cities was a highly 
negative and self-relevant outcome for the overwhelming 
majority of participants, since support for the application 
had been immense in the populace. Interestingly, our study 
revealed an inverse hindsight bias in terms of foreseeabil-
ity, resembling the effects obtained in studies involving 
negative decision outcomes, whereas a strong positive 
hindsight effect emerged for inevitability impressions, 
just as in the retroactive pessimism studies. Moreover, 
reinforcing our argument above, there was correlative 
evidence to link these effects to different psychologi-
cal functions. Decreases in foreseeability were stronger 
in individuals who had shown more commitment to the 
application (e.g., active support), highlighting the same 
avoidance of self-blame as in the decision-making studies 
discussed above; it would have seemed foolish to claim in 
hindsight that the case one had so eagerly supported had 
been foreseeably doomed. In contrast, increases in per-
ceived inevitability were strongly and positively related 
to the intensity of disappointment by the outcome, in line 
with Tykocinski’s (2001) retroactive pessimism idea.
Importantly, returning to the focus of this article, 
these opposite foreseeability and inevitability shifts were 
observed in a situation in which there was no personal 
control whatsoever over the outcome. This suggests that 
the opposite effects observed in previous studies were 
probably driven by the different hindsight components, 
rather than by any differences in the controllability of the 
event outcomes in question. Supporting this interpreta-
tion, Pezzo and Beckstead (2008) found no effect of event 
controllability on their foreseeability-related measure of 
hindsight bias.
The Present Research
Nevertheless, the evidence discussed in favor of this 
idea is circumstantial, and it would be more convincing 
to contrast the impact of controllability and hindsight 
component within one and the same setting. This was the 
purpose of the present study. Using a scenario approach, 
we investigated both variables in a fully crossed, within-
 participants design. Note that assessing both foreseeabil-
ity and inevitability within participants invites consistency 
effects, since these two often go hand in hand—often, 
foreseeability presupposes some degree of determined-
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because the participants were not supposed to see the outcomes in 
advance and were required to provide their ratings without looking 
at the scenarios again. Initially, the participants were, depending 
on perspective (actor vs. observer), instructed to put themselves as 
much as possible in the position of the actor or to imagine being an 
observer who happens to witness the described situation. They then 
read the first scenario, answered a number of items related to it (see 
below), and continued with the second and third scenarios. Finally, 
they provided demographic information and were given the oppor-
tunity to write open comments on the study (only a few participants 
did so). Reading through the scenarios and answering all items took 
about 25 min, on average.
Measures3
After each scenario, the participants first answered, on scales 
from 1 (don’t agree at all ) to 6 (totally agree), a set of items intended 
to measure the foreseeability and perceived inevitability of the (an-
ticipated, in the actor–foresight condition) scenario outcome. Since 
there were two possible, dichotomous outcomes in each scenario 
(e.g., to pass or fail the exam, to arrive on time or late), two items 
each probed these outcomes separately, followed by seven unspecific 
items (four relating to foreseeability and three to inevitability), in the 
sense that they asked for “the outcome” only, leaving its definition 
to the participants. After detailed scale analyses, the specific items 
were dropped from both scales, along with an unspecific item each, 
resulting in a three-item foreseeability measure and a two-item mea-
sure of inevitability, both consisting of outcome-unspecific items, in 
agreement with similar scales used in Blank and Nestler (2006) and 
Blank et al. (2008). The three (translated) foreseeability items were 
(1) “I know all along how this situation will turn out,” (2) “From the 
development of the situation, only one particular outcome can be 
expected,” and (3) “It is difficult to predict how the event will turn 
out” (reverse coded).4 The two inevitability items were (1) “Under 
the given circumstances the outcome is completely determined” and 
(2) “Because of the many factors that can influence the outcome 
of the situation, the outcome is still open” (reverse coded). All the 
items were worded in the present tense, because they were used in 
combination with a hypothetical-design instruction (see Pohl, 2007) 
to ignore the outcome and answer the foreseeability and inevitabil-
ity items as if they did not know it. This ensured that any obtained 
hindsight effects could be truly considered biases from a normative 
point of view, since the instruction rendered the outcome norma-
tively irrelevant for the judgments. The internal consistencies of the 
scales were satisfactory, with Cronbach’s αs of .79 (foreseeability) 
and .71 (inevitability), and the scales were moderately correlated 
with each other (r 5 .37, averaged across conditions and control-
lability levels).
Five additional items (using the same 6-point response scale) fol-
lowed in the hindsight conditions, which were included as manipu-
lation checks and for analyses related to the psychological functions 
of the foreseeability and inevitability hindsight components (see 
below). They addressed the emotional consequences of control-
lability and perspective (actor vs. observer) in appreciating the out-
comes of the scenarios. Four items tapped regret, responsibility, 
guilt, and self-blame. Since the responses to these items were highly 
consistent (Cronbach’s α 5 .87), they were combined into a single 
self-blame scale. A fifth, separate item probed for disappoint-
ment. The participants were asked to imagine how they themselves 
would feel about the outcome (in the actor perspective) or how the 
actor would feel about it (in the observer perspective). Following 
the arguments in the introduction, self-blame should be higher in 
the high-controllability than in the low-controllability scenarios. 
Moreover, insofar as self-defense processes were already at work 
in the actor–hindsight condition, the level of self-blame should be 
reduced, as compared with the observer–hindsight condition. In 
contrast, disappointment would not necessarily be expected to dif-
fer as a function of controllability but should be reduced if some 
coping—in the sense of retroactive pessimism—has taken place in 
the actor–hindsight condition.
laptop scenario was very similar to the scenario used by Tykocinski 
(2001, Experiment 1): A person hears that there is a discount offer on 
a laptop he or she has intended to buy for quite some time. However, 
the special offer ends this very day, and there is not much time left to 
rush to the shop. In the end, the shop is already closed upon the per-
son’s arrival. In the high-controllability condition, the person thinks 
too late about getting cash and, therefore, has to take a detour to an 
ATM; later, the person ignores a road work sign, which leads to a 
punctured bicycle tire. In the low-controllability condition, the delay 
is due to rush-hour traffic, a broken-down ATM, and a punctured 
tire caused by a nail in the street that was hard to spot. (3) The exam 
scenario involved a student who fails an important final exam, either 
because the student spent the revision time partying and on a last-
minute vacation in the Caribbean (high controllability) or because 
the student contracted a heavy cold and his or her grandmother died 
during revision time (low controllability).
The three scenarios had been selected from an initial sample of 
12 scenarios on the basis of a pretest (N 5 64) in which ratings of 
four different versions of each scenario were obtained (by a fourth 
of the participants each): high and low controllability, crossed with 
perspective (actor hindsight vs. observer hindsight; pretesting the 
actor–foresight version was not deemed necessary). The pretest 
sought to establish that the scenarios were (1) sufficiently negative 
and (2) unsurprising (since surprise affects hindsight bias in ways 
unrelated to the focus of our experiment; see Müller & Stahlberg, 
2007, for a review). Moreover, (3) the participants should be able to 
identify themselves with the actor in the actor condition or should 
perceive the scenario as realistic in the observer condition. Finally, 
(4) there should be a clear difference in perceived controllability 
between the high- and low-controllability versions of a scenario. All 
ratings were given on scales from 1 to 9. The three chosen scenarios 
had average ratings of 7.0 for negativity (9 5 high negativity), 2.7 
for surprisingness (1 5 low surprise), 6.8 for identification (9 5 
high identification), and 7.3 for realism (9 5 high realism). They 
also differed clearly in terms of perceived controllability, with aver-
age ratings of 6.9 for high-controllability versions and 3.9 for low-
controllability versions (9 5 high controllability).
In all the hindsight conditions, a section entitled “situation de-
scription” contained the body of a given scenario, and a section en-
titled “event outcome” contained a single sentence presenting the 
outcome. The latter section was omitted in the actor–foresight con-
dition. The second-person singular was used to refer to the actor in 
the two actor conditions; in the observer condition, the third-person 
singular was used, and the person was identified by a name. The text 
of one exemplary scenario (the laptop scenario), in both controllabil-
ity versions, can be found in the Appendix.
design
The experiment followed a 3 (condition: actor–hindsight vs. 
 actor–foresight vs. observer–hindsight) 3 2 (controllability: high 
vs. low) 3 2 (component: foreseeability vs. inevitability) design, 
with repeated measurement on the last two factors and random as-
signment to the levels of the first factor. Sixty participants were as-
signed to the actor–foresight and observer–hindsight conditions. 
Because of its pivotal role in the analyses (see below), the number 
of participants in the actor–hindsight condition was raised to 90. 
Each participant received either two high-controllability scenarios 
and one low-controllability scenario or one high-controllability 
and two low-controllability scenarios. Counterbalancing ensured 
that (1) each scenario was used equally often in the high- and low-
controllability version and (2) each of the six possible presentation 
orders of the three scenarios was used equally often.
Procedure
The participants were tested in groups of 4–32 people. Group size 
was not confounded with condition or any other variable, since these 
were randomly determined by the individual booklets the partici-
pants received. They were advised to work through their booklets in 
the given order and not to browse forth or back. This was essential 
Controllability and HindsigHt Components    361
condition with the actor–foresight condition. Since the in-
dividual foreseeability and inevitability values were deter-
mined by averaging the item values (after recoding, if nec-
essary), rather than summing them up, they had the same 
metric. This allowed us to treat the two measures as within-
participants levels of the same variable. Hence, we ana-
lyzed hindsight effects, using a 2 (controllability: high vs. 
low) 3 2 (component: foreseeability vs. inevitability) 3 
2 (condition: actor–hindsight vs. actor–foresight) ANOVA 
approach. The pattern of means is shown in Figure 1. The 
ANOVA yielded significant main effects of component 
[F(1,148) 5 29.28, p , .001, ηp2 5 .17] and condition 
[F(1,148) 5 6.23, p 5 .01, ηp2 5 .04], as well as an interac-
tion between component and condition [F(1,148) 5 5.01, 
p 5 .03, ηp2 5 .03]. Neither the main effect nor any inter-
actions involving controllability (including the three-way 
interaction) were statistically significant. The main effect 
of component is noteworthy but theoretically less interest-
ing in the present context; it simply reflects the fact that 
the participants tended to generally perceive the scenario 
outcomes as more foreseeable than inevitable.
More important is the condition effect, which reflects 
hindsight bias: The participants perceived the scenario 
outcomes as more foreseeable or inevitable in hindsight 
than in foresight. The component 3 condition interaction, 
however, showed this hindsight effect to differ between 
components. Specifically, the hindsight effect did not ap-
proach significance for the foreseeability component, as 
followed up by t tests, neither in high-controllability sce-
narios [Mhindsight 5 2.81, Mforesight 5 2.62; t(148) 5 1.10, 
p 5 .28, d 5 0.18] nor in low-controllability scenarios 
[Mhindsight 5 2.64, Mforesight 5 2.47; t(148) 5 0.82, p 5 .41, 
d 5 0.14]. In contrast, significant hindsight bias emerged 
for the inevitability component, in high-controllability sce-
narios [Mhindsight 5 2.56, Mforesight 5 2.21; t(148) 5 2.10, 
RESUlTS
All the results reported below are averaged across sce-
narios whenever, depending on counterbalancing, the 
high- or low-controllability conditions comprised two sce-
narios. Missing values and outliers were extremely rare; 
therefore, all the analyses were performed on the original 
data set.5 All the statistical tests were bidirectional, unless 
otherwise noted.
Manipulation Checks
A 2 (controllability: high vs. low) 3 2 (condition: actor– 
hindsight vs. observer–hindsight) ANOVA of the self-
blame scores revealed clear main effects of controllability 
[F(1,147) 5 127.89, p , .001, ηp2 5 .47] and condition 
[F(1,147) 5 11.71, p , .001, ηp2 5 .07] and no interac-
tion between these factors. The participants reported more 
combined regret, responsibility, guilt, and self-blame in 
the high-controllability scenarios (M 5 3.91) than in the 
low-controllability scenarios (M 5 2.60). In addition, they 
showed less combined self-blame in the actor–hindsight 
condition (M 5 2.99) than in the observer–hindsight con-
dition (M 5 3.52). Both results suggest that our manipula-
tions worked as planned.
The same ANOVA with disappointment as the depen-
dent variable did not reveal any significant main effects or 
interactions. This was as expected with respect to control-
lability; the unexpected lack of a condition effect (actor–
hindsight vs. observer–hindsight) was probably due to 
disappointment being close to the ceiling (M 5 5.37 on a 
scale from 1 to 6). Overall, we conclude that our manipu-
lations were successful.
Hindsight Effects
To investigate hindsight bias as a function of control-



































Figure 1. Means of foreseeability and inevitability judgments as a function of con-
trollability and experimental condition. The amount of hindsight bias figures as the 
difference in height between two adjacent hindsight and foresight bars.
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foreseeability/high-controllability combination [Mactor 5 
2.81, Mobserver 5 3.23; t(148) 5 2.26, p 5 .03, d 5 0.38]. 
That is, the observers found the scenario outcomes more 
foreseeable than did the imagined-actor participants. 
The respective difference for the foreseeability/low-
 controllability combination can be considered marginally 
significant if interpreted unidirectionally [Mactor 5 2.64, 
Mobserver 5 2.96; t(148) 5 1.45, p 5 .07 (one-tailed), d 5 
0.24]. The comparisons involving inevitability, however, 
showed little difference between the imagined-actor par-
ticipants and observers [inevitability/high-controllability, 
Mactor 5 2.57 vs. Mobserver 5 2.64, t(148) 5 0.47, p 5 .64, 
d 5 0.08; inevitability/low-controllability, Mactor 5 2.50 
vs. Mobserver 5 2.44, t(148) 5 0.28, p 5 .78, d 5 20.05 
(the minus sign indicating that perceived inevitability was 
numerically stronger in the actor condition)].
These follow-up analyses show that the lack of hind-
sight bias in the foreseeability component, as identified in 
the previous section, seems to be related to the actor per-
spective. This holds in particular for high-controllability 
scenarios, whereas a trend that is at least similar can be 
seen in low-controllability scenarios, too. On the inevita-
bility side, though, there is no evidence that the hindsight 
effects found above depended on the self-relevance of the 
outcomes; the fact that the observers showed essentially 
the same effects suggests that what we have here may just 
be the ordinary, cold, cognitive hindsight bias that we are 
already familiar with. Again, we have to point to further 
analysis to make a better case for motivated hindsight bias 
in the sense of retroactive pessimism.
Correlational Analyses
Our last set of analyses sought to provide direct evidence 
that the hindsight effects obtained are linked, in theoretically 
meaningful ways, to specific emotional functions. Table 2 
presents correlations between self-blame and disappoint-
ment, on the one hand, and foreseeability and inevitability 
p 5 .04, d 5 0.35] and even more so in low- controllability 
scenarios [Mhindsight 5 2.50, Mforesight 5 1.96; t(148) 5 
2.84, p 5 .005, d 5 0.48]. In short, there was significant 
hindsight bias in terms of inevitability, but not in terms 
of foreseeability, and moreover, this hindsight bias was 
strongest in low-controllability scenarios, as was expected 
(even if this did not lead to statistically significant results 
involving controllability itself).
The one aspect of these results that did not perfectly meet 
our expectations was that the lowest amount of hindsight bias 
was not found for the combination of foreseeability and high 
controllability but for the foreseeability/low- controllability 
combination. We are talking here about descriptive differ-
ences, though, and given that the amount of hindsight bias 
was small and statistically nonsignificant in both cases any-
way, this should perhaps not be taken too seriously. Apart 
from this, the most noteworthy nonresult from this analysis 
of hindsight effects was the nonsignificant influence of con-
trollability. However, we point to subsequent analyses show-
ing that controllability still has a role to play.
Self-Relevance Effects on Hindsight Impressions
In order to determine whether any of the hindsight 
(non)effects found in the previous analysis were due 
to the self-relevance of the outcomes, we compared the 
actor– hindsight participants’ impressions with those of the 
observer– hindsight participants. Since the latter group was 
not asked to identify with the actors, the scenario outcomes 
should be much less self-relevant for them than for the 
imagined-actor participants. The same ANOVA as above 
(apart from the different conditions involved) showed a 
main effect of hindsight component as before [F(1,148) 5 
40.10, p , .001, ηp2 5 .21], as well as an interaction be-
tween component and condition [F(1,148) 5 9.47, p 5 
.002, ηp2 5 .06]. No other significant effects emerged.
The pattern of means is presented in Figure 2. The 


































Figure 2. Means of foreseeability and inevitability judgments as a function of con-
trollability and experimental condition. The actor–hindsight bars are the same as 
those in Figure 1. The height difference between two adjacent actor and observer bars 
reflects the influence of self-relevance on hindsight impressions.
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dISCUSSION
Let us briefly review the three major sets of findings 
from our study. (1) Hindsight bias followed component: 
There was significant hindsight bias in terms of inevi-
tability, but not in terms of foreseeability. Descriptively, 
the amount of inevitability hindsight bias was stronger 
in low- controllability scenarios. (2) Actor–observer dif-
ferences in hindsight impressions followed component as 
well. Specifically, the actors found the scenario outcomes 
less foreseeable than did the observers; this was a signifi-
cant difference with high-controllability scenarios and a 
trend with low-controllability scenarios. Furthermore, the 
inevitability impressions of the actors and observers were 
almost identical at both levels of controllability. (3) Cor-
relations between self-blame and disappointment and 
hindsight impression were in line with both the self-blame 
avoidance and the retroactive pessimism accounts. Re-
markably, these effects followed controllability rather than 
component (descriptively, though, the disappointment– 
inevitability correlation was somewhat stronger than the 
disappointment–foreseeability correlation).
Three conclusions can be derived from these findings. 
First, for the prototypical combination of high- controllability 
and foreseeability impressions, there is straightforward sup-
portive evidence from all three analyses for a self-blame 
avoidance mechanism sensu Mark and Mellor (1991), Louie 
(1999), and Pezzo and Pezzo (2007). Second, for the proto-
typical combination of low- controllability and inevitability 
impressions, there is some support, mostly from the corre-
lational analysis, for retroactive pessimism as suggested by 
Tykocinski and colleagues (Tykocinski, 2001; Tykocinski 
et al., 2002; Tykocinski & Steinberg, 2005). In addition, 
there is significant hindsight bias, as was expected, and 
the actor–observer difference, although small and not sig-
nificant, is at least in the right direction. Hence, the overall 
picture that emerges from this combined evidence is in line 
with the idea of retroactive pessimism, although it is not 
as convincing as in the self-blame avoidance case. In sum, 
both of the motivational mechanisms highlighted in previ-
ous studies on hindsight bias for self-relevant negative event 
outcomes were operating in our experiment, under their re-
spective prototypical combinations of controllability and 
hindsight component as identified in the introduction.
Having established this, we can now revisit the main 
question of this experiment—namely, the question regard-
ing the relative importance of controllability and the hind-
impressions, on the other, for various combinations of sce-
nario controllability (high vs. low) and hindsight perspec-
tive (actor vs. observer). Focusing on the actor– hindsight 
condition first, we note that the strongest correlation of 
self-blame is with foreseeability in high-controllability sce-
narios, whereas the strongest correlation of disappointment 
is with inevitability in low- controllability scenarios. This is 
exactly what is to be expected from the self-blame avoid-
ance and from the retroactive pessimism point of view, 
respectively. Under high controllability, foreseeability is 
conducive to self-blame: The higher the perceived foresee-
ability of the negative outcome, the more people have to 
blame themselves for it—hence, the positive correlation be-
tween these variables. Furthermore, under low controllabil-
ity, perceived inevitability is prototypically suited to reduce 
disappointment (there was nothing that could be done about 
it)—hence, the negative correlation between the latter vari-
ables. Proceeding from one of these prototypical combi-
nations toward the other, the (absolute) magnitudes of the 
correlations decrease, indicating the decreasing importance 
of the respective emotions under those circumstances.
The correlations in the observer–hindsight condition, by 
comparison, do not show much of a systematic pattern and 
are generally lower (with the exception of the .27 correla-
tion of self-blame with inevitability in high-control sce-
narios, for which we have no explanation except a possible 
Type I error). In short, the observer participants’ hindsight 
impressions did not have much emotional significance for 
them. In turn, this underscores the motivational nature of 
the hindsight effects in the actor–hindsight condition, as is 
predicted by both the self-blame avoidance and retroactive 
pessimism views and by the idea of motivated hindsight 
bias in general (e.g., Campbell & Tesser, 1983; Musch & 
Wagner, 2007; Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007).
Finally, it is important to note that in these analyses, 
unlike in the others presented so far, the pattern of results 
follows a grouping according to controllability, rather 
than according to the hindsight component. Specifically, 
self-blame played a role in high-controllability scenarios 
but did not in low-controllability scenarios, practically 
regardless of component. The opposite controllability-
driven pattern, although less distinctive, emerges for 
disappointment. In summary, our correlational analyses 
established support for a motivational hindsight bias, in 
terms of self-blame avoidance and retroactive pessimism, 
and also indicated that controllability may not be so unim-
portant after all for these effects.
Table 2 
Correlations Between Emotions and Hindsight Components
Actor–Hindsight Observer–Hindsight
Condition/Measure  Self-Blame  Disappointment  Self-Blame  Disappointment
High controllability
 Foreseeability 1.28** 2.09 1.18 2.01
 Inevitability 1.26* 2.13 1.27* 2.12
Low controllability
 Foreseeability 1.14 2.22* 1.15 1.03
 Inevitability 1.13 2.32** 1.05 2.01
*p , .05. **p , .01.
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sight component for the opposite motivational hindsight 
effects obtained here and in earlier studies. In this respect, 
the third clear conclusion we can derive from our findings 
is that the hindsight component matters. In two out of three 
analyses, component had a clear effect on hindsight im-
pressions, and there was at least some supportive evidence 
in the third, correlational analysis. Note that this holds in 
spite of the likely presence of a trend toward consistency 
between foreseeability and inevitability judgments (as in-
ferred from the moderate correlation of r 5 .37 between 
the two components), which would work against observing 
any differences between the components, and this, in turn, 
makes our conclusion even stronger. Hence, as would be 
expected from our theoretical analysis and from an earlier 
study (Blank & Nestler, 2006), the opposite motivational 
effects are logically tied to the nature and functions of the 
different hindsight components. By implication, this also 
supports the underlying idea of fundamentally different 
hindsight components (Blank et al., 2008).
What about the role of controllability, though? The evi-
dence is mixed. Statistically, there was little support from 
the hindsight bias and self-relevance analyses. Note, how-
ever, that the inevitability hindsight bias was descriptively 
stronger in low-controllability scenarios (see Figure 1). 
Also, the motivated reduction of foreseeability, as shown 
by the actor–hindsight participants, as compared with the 
observer–hindsight participants, was descriptively larger 
in high-controllability scenarios (see Figure 2). These 
trends might reflect a genuine but small effect of control-
lability that went undetected for power reasons. This inter-
pretation is reinforced by the results of the correlational 
analysis, which did follow a controllability pattern. Hence, 
with tentative support from two analyses and stronger sup-
port from a third, it seems fair to say that a contribution 
of controllability to our opposite motivational hindsight 
effects remains a viable option.
Even so, we note that in our study, the hindsight com-
ponent influenced our participants’ hindsight perceptions 
more strongly than controllability did. This is a remark-
able finding, given that controllability has so far been the 
only solution offered for the persistent anomaly regarding 
hindsight effects of self-relevant negative events. With our 
study, a strong alternative candidate emerges, and we hope 
that future theorizing and research will clarify the condi-
tions under which the hindsight component or controlla-
bility is more important in terms of generating self-blame 
avoidance or retroactive pessimism effects.
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APPENdIx 
laptop Scenario (Actor Conditions)
Situation description (High-Controllability Version)
For quite some time you have been thinking about getting a new laptop. However, the model you were focus-
ing on has been too expensive as yet. This afternoon you meet a friend who tells you that he bought this laptop 
yesterday and is quite enthusiastic about it. Two days ago, a new computer store was opened out of town. As an 
introductory offer, this very laptop had been reduced by €350. The price has to be paid in cash though, and the 
offer is valid only until tonight. After that, the price will increase again.
It is already quite late. You wonder if you can make it there before closing time. After all, the store is out of 
town and you’d have to go right through the city centre. You get started as the laptop is very important for you. 
Reckoning that you’d be too slow on a bus during rush hour, you go home to get your bike. On your bike, you 
ride quickly to the store.
On the way you remember that you need cash, so you turn around and go to an ATM you know. Remembering 
earlier would have saved you this detour. [Low-controllability version: On the way you stop at an ATM to get 
some cash. Unfortunately, the ATM doesn’t work. You therefore go to another ATM even though this involves 
a detour.]
Some two kilometers before the store you notice a road work sign. In order to get on faster, you decide to 
ignore the warning. This is bad news however, as it leads to your front tire being punctured. [Low-controllability 
version: Some two kilometers before the store you notice that there’s something wrong with your front tire. You 
check—a nail that must have been on the bike path sticks in your front tire, which is now flat.] You lock the bike 
to a fence and proceed on foot. Minutes later you arrive at the store.
Event Outcome
The store is already closed—you are late.
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